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PLANE TALK

FAA, Flight Standards District Office
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http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/field_offices/fsdo/lnk/
For Safety Meeting Info–www.faasafety.gov

UPCOMING EVENT

April 21, 2006—Beatrice, NE, Annual Airport Party

April 27, 2006—Lincoln Aviation Safety Meeting, Silverhawk Jet Center, 7:00 p.m.

May 21, 206—11th Annual Evelyn Sharp Fly-in, Ord, NE

May 24, 2006—Second Annual NeBAA Mechanics Seminar, Union Pacific Railroad Hangar, Omaha, NE, 9:00 a.m.

July 16,-18, 2006—Nebraska State Fly-in, McCook, NE

July 3-8, 2006—Deaf Pilots' Association Fly-in, Martin Field, South Sioux City, NE

For Safety Meetings: www.faasafety.gov

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FAA AVIATION NEWS

For more FAA information, you can subscribe to the <u>FAA AVIATION NEWS</u> magazine by calling the Government Printing Office (GPO) at (202) 512-1800. GPO's code for the magazine is FAN. You can also call the FSDO, (402) 475-1738, and ask for a copy of the magazine and use the subscription form included in the magazine. We only get a few extra copies of the magazine for each edition, but we will put your name on a waiting list and send you one when we get it. Cost of the magazine is $21.00 per year.

SECURITY

Because of increased security at FAA offices, we must keep our office locked; therefore, no one will be allowed in the office without an appointment. **Also, when entering our facility, you may not have any items in your possession that are not fully exposed and easily viewed. Briefcases, purses and backpacks are not allowed. REMEMBER: PLEASE CALL FOR AN APPOINTMENT BEFORE YOU MAKE A TRIP TO OUR OFFICE.**



WINGS PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

Congratulations to the following pilots for having successfully participated in the Pilot Proficiency Award (WINGS) Program:

PHASE 1: Brandon D. Biba, Bryce P. Curry, Kenneth J. Hanks, Duane Ohlrich, Michael L. Roberts, Robert Schoepfer, Matthew S. Wright

PHASE II: Rodney Eigsti, Jonathan E. Fuller, Dan Hollins, John R. Marrinan

PHASE III: Jeff Hageman, Bradley Krumel, Dale Meick, Daniel L. Petersen

PHASE IV: Harlon A. Hain, Timothy S. Holmberg, Rodney Matlock, Roger K. Nunley, Donald G. Pearson, Gerald S. Pfeffer

PHASE V: Roger L. Bartels, Ernest J. DeSimone, Douglas Krueger, Amy McNaught, Allen Soll, Ray E. Townsend, Scott Vogler

PHASE VI: Stephen B. Cox, Douglas W. Pollock, Jeremy C. Strack

PHASE VII: Charles Paulger, John A. Virgl

PHASE VIII: Dallas E. Baker, John C. Bartholomew, John E. Drap, Jr., William J. Greiner, Steve Treinen. Thomas Trumble

PHASE IX: Vergil Heyer, Dennis N. Olmstead, Larry M. Smith, Chuck Stoke

PHASE X: Dwayne F. Margritz, James C. Murphy

PHASE XI: David W. Glenn

PHASE XII: Hal R. Ellis

PHASE XIII: J. Arthur Curtiss, Claude I. Hobson

PHASE XVII: David J. Biba, James Lalumendre, Jacob E. Wilson

INTRODUCING THE FAA SAFETY TEAM

Why Change?

On June 30, 1970, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) completed the evaluation of an innovative two-year conceptual program aimed at reducing general aviation accidents. From its inception, the purpose was to enhance aviation safety through public education. The success of this initial experimental program became the foundation for the industry, government, and individual collaboration known as the Accident Prevention Program. For the past 36 years, these programs have been a major influence in reducing aviation accident and runway incursions.

The remarkable achievements of the Aviation Safety program would never have been possible without the shared efforts and expertise of the volunteer "team" of individuals or organizations that bonded together to accomplish this common goal. But advancements in technology, expansion of world aviation markets and the FAA's own evolutionary quest to provide the highest possible degree of safety in air transportation while maintaining fiscal responsibility, have rendered the internal structure of the old Aviation Safety Program obsolete.

The FAA has progressed from strictly a governmental oversight entity to an organization that proactively seeks the most effective methods to promote aviation safety beyond regulatory compliance. Great success has been realized with the introduction of the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) and the Surveillance & Evaluation Program for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 121 air carriers. Beginning October 1, 2006, the FAA will use similar risk management and System Safety engineering principles to develop new programs aimed at reducing all facets of aviation accidents, including general aviation, with the introduction of the new FAA Safety Team, or FAASTeam.

The FAASTeam will develop systematic and targeted products to effectively reduce accidents in areas where there has been limited success in the past, or that were previously outside the scope of the old Aviation Safety Program. While the FAA will continue to ensure regulatory compliance, the best way to realize the next significant incremental reduction in aviation accidents will be through identification of risk causal factors. Then specific products and programs can be developed in partnership with the aviation community, to systematically reduce or eliminate those risks.

How Will This Change Occur?

The FAA's mission is to provide the safest and most efficient aerospace system in the world. Today, this is being accomplished using a concept called System Safety and its core value of risk management. System Safety simply says that a product will be safe when, and only when, it is designed that way. In other words, safety cannot be inspected into a product. It must be built in from the beginning. Applying System Safety principles is a deliberate and calculated process.

For System Safety to work, it assumes that the organization that produces or manages a product has a fully functioning system. It must have the people, materials, equipment, tools, software, and facilities to support its product and they have to be in good working order. That's one of the basic challenges for general aviation. An individual owner/operator doesn't always have an organized "system" to function within or readily available to guide them in their aviation endeavors.

Secondly, when the system exists, it must be continuously protected from unnecessary and unwanted risk by applying risk management techniques. The organization or individual must constantly be looking for concerns or hazards that have some likelihood of occurring, and that would have any degree of severity.

Again, many general aviation operations are constantly exposed to risk because they have little or no system to support their operation. Risk management sometimes consists of as little as a weather briefing, so it's no surprise that this segment of aviation accounts for the highest fatal accident rate.

When there is a complete and well functioning system, then we can begin to apply risk management principles. You have a solid foundation to work with that can be readily adapted or modified to meet risk. It's then, and only then, that System Safety attributes can be effectively applied.

System Safety builds a safety net around your system. It assures that someone is held responsible for safety and has the authority to ensure its continued use. It guarantees that there are detailed procedures to be used and not just policy statements, a culture of corporate history, or just good intentions to accomplish goals.

System Safety then makes sure there are controls in place to see that the procedures are being followed, and that there are process measures to make sure you are getting what you want from your system. Finally, System Safety demands that there are interfaces between the various components of the system so they are all "singing the same tune."

While System Safety is much easier to apply to larger organizations with depth of resource, it still translates directly from the mega air carrier to the individual general aviation owner/operator. The way the FAA Safety Team will encourage the use of this new philosophy will be through Safety Management Systems.

(Continued on Page 3)

INTRODUCING THE FAA SAFETY TEAM (Continued)

A Safety Management System (SMS) is an integrated set of work practices, beliefs, and procedures for monitoring, supporting, and improving the quality of safety and human performance in and organization. Safety Management Systems recognize the potential for errors and establish robust defenses to ensure that errors do not result in incidents or accidents. For example, analysis of risks common to general aviation aircraft operations shows that 75.9% of the fatal accidents occur in personal flying. Of that number, coincidentally, 75.9% are pilot induced. Finally, the category of flying that historically is the most lethal is weather related and according to the AOPA Air Safety Foundation's 2004 Nall Report, continued visual flight rule (VFR) flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) accounts for 87.5% of those accidents. It doesn't take much analysis to realize that if we can design a Safety management System that includes specific defenses against continued VFR flight into IMC, we can immediately realize a huge reduction in fatal accidents.

How would that be applied to you as a general aviation owner/operator? It would most likely begin with a FAASTeam safety seminar that points out the hazards of continued VFR flight in IMC, targeted by a spring or fall presentation where these accidents are most prevalent. More in-depth information could be conveyed through a course of on-line training, made available through the Aviation Learning Center, along with specific tools to help you use an aeronautical decision-making process to avoid this type of hazard. The Web site is www.faasafety.gov. These tools already exist in various forms, like the "3-P" Risk Management Process (Perceive, Process, Perform) and the "PAVE" Personal Minimums Checklist (Pilot, Aircraft, enVironment, External Pressures). Finally, practical application of these tools could be made available for you to apply your knowledge in a no risk environment. The application of your newly acquired skills and tools would be accomplished using flight training devices or personal computer aircraft training device-based scenarios, guided by an instructor.

By managing risk in this manner, we can help you build relationships that will form your own system of protection with procedures, equipment, materials, tools, software, people and facilities, the same way airlines do. The new FAASTeam Safety Management System products will promote collaborative partnerships that will aid you in identifying and avoiding hazards that can lead to accidents. Your personal SMS would include:

- Detailed inspection records/checklists recommended by your mechanic or fixed base operator for assuring aircraft airworthiness status and determining the aircraft's condition for safe flight. This could include repetitive airworthiness directives and time-life limited components.
- Formalized weather briefing documentation, recorded and compared to established personal minimum checklists to aid in making objective "Go/No Go" decisions.
- Procedures for use of passengers as Crew Resource Management sources.
- Routine and documented post-flight reviews for risk analysis and adjustment of personal minimums.
- Regularly scheduled skill improvement training sessions with appropriate flight instructors in areas where you have performed self-analysis and identified needed improvement.
- Identification of methods and procedures to recognize "triggers" of accident chain events and predetermined escape methods.

While the safety tools we have advocated in the past are still valid today, the emphasis of the FAASTeam will be in the way these tools are produced, offered, utilized, and improved. Our success will be dependant upon creating a support system that will enable you to adopt and easily use the tools and that provides feedback so that your newly developed safety management system can be constantly improved. The faasafety.gov Web side will be the link to providing that feedback.

www.faasafety.gov

Delivering information and training to airmen when they need it, in an easily accessible format, is essential to the FAASTeam implementation. The www.faassafety.gov Web site will be the FAASTeam cornerstone for collection and dissemination of critical aviation safety information. The Web site is designed to respond to national, regional, and local airmen needs. When you sign up, you can specify your preferences for the kinds of information you wish to receive and specific geographic areas. The Web site currently includes:

- Immediate notification of localized or national safety situations that affect you.
- Safety Program Airmen Notification System (SPANS)
- Airmen educational courses readily available in an open, user-friendly format.

A good example of the type of courses that will be provided in the Aviation Learning Center is "Navigating the DC ADIZ, TFRs, and Special Use Airspace." This course is a thorough review of the Washington ADIZ and TFR specific regulations along with general information governing Special Use Airspace. Each chapter is clear and concise with appropriate graphics and background documents. After completing the course you can test your knowledge with the attached exam and print out a

(Continued on Page 4)

INTRODUCING THE FAA SAFETY TEAM (Continued)

certificate of successful completion. As FAASTeam programs develop and expand, airmen will be able to use this education resource to build their knowledge on a variety of subjects that have been identified as critical risks to flight safety and to assist them in managing those risks.

Who'll Make it Happen?

The transition period from Aviation Safety Program has already begun. One of the main questions being asked is, "What will happen to the Aviation Safety Counselors when the Aviation Safety Program sunsets?" The answer is that the FAASTeam will still need enthusiastic, dedicated, and motivated persons and organizations to join the FAA Safety Team. These new volunteers will be called FAASTeam Representatives and Partners. They will be instrumental in producing, coordinating, and mentoring Safety Management System programs ranging from 14 CFR Part 121 air carriage to Light Sport aircraft operation and maintenance.

The major reason why the counselor designations will expires on September 30, 2006, is that there will no longer be a Safety Program Manager position. Instead, the FAASTeam will be selecting FAA inspectors as new FAASTeam Program Managers based upon a number of requirements including areas of subject matter expertise, airmen domicile populations, numbers of resident air carrier and air agency certificates, accident statistics and trends, along with geographic considerations. The reality is that there may not be a FAASTeam program Manager (FPM) in every Flight Standards District Office (FSDO). Some of the new FAASTeam Program Managers will have responsibility for geographic areas that include more than one FSDO district.

The new FAASTeam Program Managers will be actively seeking volunteers from the aviation community to act as FAASTeam Representatives and Partners. These persons will be highly respected and proficient individuals who are passionate about managing a FAASTeam program within their geographic area of responsibility. FAASTeam Lead Representatives will direct and guide FAASTeam Representatives in the accomplishment of programs developed and sponsored by the FAA Safety Team.

Getting Started

As with any type of change, initial uncertainty or skepticism is normal. But the FAA Safety Team will build on those areas where we have been very successful in the past and build new programs for areas of risk that have yet to be addressed. However, the new FAA Safety Team's success is wholly dependant on the partnership between the FAA and the aviation community working together to make measurable advances in aviation safety. These successes will be impossible without the collaborative effort of businesses and individuals with a shared passion for aviation and who champion safety. Working together we have the opportunity to continue what has succeeded in the past, while making new and significant progress never before possible.

The FAA Safety Team will be just that, a team of individuals, business and government working toward a common goal. Come join the team!
Courtesy or FAA Aviation News

GPS UPDATE CARDS

Does the FAA require any type of record entry when a front panel-mounted GPS unit is updated?

The short answer is yes. A record is required with an appropriate signature.

The requirement is based upon Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 43, Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration. Appendix A to Part 43, Major Alterations, Major Repairs, and Preventive Maintenance, Subparagraph (c) Preventive maintenance, Item (32) permits the updating. Item (32) states, "Updating self-contained, front instrument panel-mounted Air Traffic Control (ATC) navigational software data bases (excluding those of automatic flight control systems, transponders, and microwave frequency distance measuring equipment (DME) provided no disassembly of the unit is required and pertinent instructions are provided. Prior to the unit's intended use, an operational check with applicable sections of Part 91 of this chapter."

Since updating is authorized as a preventive maintenance item under Part 43, the part has a record-keeping requirement for preventive work. That requirement is specified in Section 43.9 titled, Content, Form and Disposition of Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration Records (except inspections performed in accordance with part 91, Part 125, Section 135.411(a)(1), and Section 135.419 of this chapter). "(a) Maintenance record entries. Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, each person who maintains, performs preventive maintenance, rebuild, or alters an aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or component part shall make an entry in the maintenance record of the equip-

GPS UPDATE CARDS (Continued)

ment containing the following information: (1) A description (or reference to data acceptable to the Administrator) of work performed. (2) The date of completion of the work performed. (3) The name of the person performing the work if other than the person specified in paragraph (a)(4) of this section. (4) If the work performed on the aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or component part has been performed satisfactorily, the signature, certificate number, and kind of certificate held by the person approving the work. The signature constitutes the approval for return to service only for the work performed."

Finally, section 43.7 lists the persons authorized to approve an sign off work on aircraft, airframes, aircraft engines, propellers, appliance, or component parts for return to service after maintenance, preventive maintenance, rebuilding, or alteration. Subparagraph (f) of the section says, "A person holding at least a private pilot certificate may approve an aircraft for return to service after performing preventive maintenance under the provisions of Section 43.4(g)."

Courtesy of FAA Aviation News

ELT UPDATE—LIMIT YOUR 406 MHz TESTING TIME

FAA regulations, Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Section 91.207(d)(4), requires that an aircraft emergency locator transmitter (ELT) be tested annually for "the presence of a sufficient signal radiated from its antenna." The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) in Chapter 6, Section 6-2-5, discusses ELTs, their use, and how to test them. To paraphrase a statement from a movie about a failed trip to the Moon, "Folks, we have a problem." The FAA requires an ELT radiated test, but if the test is not done properly, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) might take enforcement action against the person doing a 406 MHz ELT test.

Here is the problem. When the FAA test requirements were written, the basic ELT was an analog 121.5 MHz unit transmitting in the aeronautical frequency band. If the ELT being tested could not be isolated within an approved radio frequency shielded room or container, which keeps the signal from going beyond the room or container, a radiated test could be done within the first five minutes after the hour. The test requirements listed the number of recommended sweeps of the signal to minimize the risk of anyone thinking the test signal was an actual distress alert. The person doing the test would quickly activate the ELT, listen for its distinctive sound on a nearby aeronautical band aircraft radio or handheld transceiver and then turn off the ELT.

This test method met the FAA requirement and most organizations were okay with the idea. That was until the newer 406 MHz ELT distress beacon was developed. Part of the problem is that instead of being in the aeronautical band, 406 MHz is a protected international distress frequency. Plus, with a properly registered 406 MHz ELT, the transmitted signal includes a digital code that can be used to identify the owner. As a result, the FCC can track down anyone who, in its opinion, transmits a fraudulent or non-emergency distress signal, e.g. an FAA test.

Since most 406 MHz ELTs include a low-powered 121.5 MHz homing transmitter, the challenge for the person doing the annual ELT check is how to satisfy the FAA requirement without violating the FCC regulations. Since in most cases the person doing the testing has no way to monitor the 406 MHz emitted coded signal without special equipment and can therefore only listen for the activation of the 121.5 MHz homing signal of the combined 406/121.5 MHz ELT.

Short of a change in the regulation, the following is one means of conducting the test. Remember, the purpose of test is to check the aircraft's installed system from ELT transmitter to its antenna.

Anyone testing an ELT should follow the manufacturer's recommended procedures. If those procedures are not available and cannot be found, the following is one procedure that has been coordinated with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) which operates the United States portion of the international satellite-based search and rescue system that monitors and processes distress beacon alerts.

Owners of 406 MHz ELTs should limit any test to less than 30 seconds. This will preclude the satellites from receiving a signal from the 406 MHz beacon when activated to the "ON" condition (or switch position) while testing the 121.5 MHz ELT portion of a combined ELT. This will prevent the government from initiating a search and rescue action. There have been numerous reports of unintentional activation of the combined ELTs when periodic maintenance testing of the 121.5 MHz signal is tested to assure proper performance. Activating the "ON" function, which is part of the remote control panel rather than gaining access to the combined ELT and activating the "TEST" function, has led to violations administered from the FCC and causes emergency responders to react in an attempt to locate a downed aircraft. If the selection to the "ON" position is minimized to 30 seconds or less, there is sufficient time protection to prevent crossing the 50-second time threshold for activating the 406 MHz locator signal.

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ELT UPDATE—LIMIT YOUR 406 MHz TESTING TIME (Continued)

(Continued from page 5)

Operators should advise their maintenance personnel of this limitation and possible vulnerability to violations or sanctions.

The following are excerpts from AIM Section 6-2-5, Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), dealing with testing, false alarms, and reporting.

Testing

1. ELTs should be tested in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. This should be done, preferably, in a shielded or screened room or specially designed test container to prevent the broadcast of signals, which could trigger a false alert.
2. When this cannot be done, aircraft operational testing is authorized as follows:
   (a) Analog 121.5/243 MHz ELTs should only be tested during the first five minutes after any hour. If operational test must be made outside of this period, they should be coordinated with the nearest FAA Control Tower or Flight Service Station. Tests should be no longer than three audible weeps. If the antenna is removable, a dummy load should be substituted during test procedures.
   (b) Digital 406 MHz ELTs should only be tested in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
   (c) Airborne test are not authorized.

False Alarms

1. Caution should be exercised to prevent the inadvertent activation of ELTs in the air or while they are being handled on the ground. Accidental or unauthorized activation will generate an emergency signal that cannot be distinguished from the real thing, leading to expensive and frustrating searches. A false ELT signal could also interfere with genuine emergency transmissions and hinder or prevent the timely location of crash sites. Frequent false alarms could also result in complacency and decrease the vigorous reaction that must be attached to all ELT signals.
2. Numerous cases of inadvertent activation have occurred as a result of aerobatics, hard landings, movement by ground crews, and aircraft maintenance. These false alarms can be minimized by monitoring 121.5 MHz and or 243.0 MHz as follows:
   (a) In flight when a receiver is available.
   (b) Before engine shut down at the end of each flight.
   (c) When the ELT is handled during installation or maintenance.
   (d) When maintenance is being performed near the ELT.
   (e) When a ground crew moves the aircraft.
   (f) If an ELT signal is heard, turn off the aircraft's ELT to determine if it is transmitting. If it has been activated, maintenance might be required before the unit is returned to the "ARMED" position. You should contact the nearest air traffic facility and notify it of the inadvertent activation.

Inflight Monitoring and Reporting

1. Pilots are encouraged to monitor 121.5 MHz and/or 243.0 MHz while inflight to assist in identifying possible emergency ELT transmissions. On receiving a signal, report the following information to the nearest air traffic facility:
   (a) Your position at the time the signal was first heard.
   (b) Your position at the time the signal was last heard.
   (c) Your position at maximum signal strength.
   (d) Your flight altitudes and frequency on which the emergency signal was heard: 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz. If possible, positions should be given relative to the navigation aid. If the aircraft has homing equipment, provide the bearing to the emergency signal with each reported position.

Courtesy of FAA Aviation News.

AMT AWARDS

A "well-done" to the maintenance technicians and companies who have successfully participated in the aviation maintenance awards program.

Bronze
Ted Fritsch
Jeff Davis
Robert Hanson
George Smith, III
James Simonitch
Stanley Denman
Erick Copeland
Richard Griesert
Morris Harris
Joseph Malocha
Roger Palmiter
Jay Pennington
Justin C. Vena
Steve Alder
Donald Bashus
Jerry Bremer
James A. Brockman
Charles Eighmy
Michael Goldsmith
Phillip E. Huntley
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Matthew Kunc
Hugo Melo
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Jathan Saltzman
Sam Schluckebier
Thomas Seidl
Timothy M. Smith

Silver
Joel Heiserman
Jeff Miller
Adam Shelburg
Tim Shrum
Jason Thurman
Mark Whitney
William D. Harris
Christopher Peet
James Smith
Darrell Stephens
Thomas Bennett
Darrick Blackman
Brent Elliott
Jonathan Freeman
James Hood
Scotty Long
Timothy R. McClellan
Donna Reis
Andrew Trumble
Brian Nystrom

Gold
Craig Elvers
Rick Konyek
Frank Borsh
Drew Oetjen
David Hagglund
Wayne Jensen
Michael Lucht
Kim Wallace
Tommy Johnson
Curtis Lubker
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Kenneth L. Minnick
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Eric Buzzell
Barry Burkey
Mike Chick
Steven Craig
Tim Divis
Jeffrey Hall
Thomas Henry
Steven Joe
Jeffrey King
Craig Kingery
Talbert Lierman
Joseph Moritz
Eric Olson
Jim Weverka

Ruby
Dennis Clark
Adam Reasoner
Michael Brouwer
Matthew J. Wright
Dale Taylor
Karoly Kiss
Nathan Lantzy
Luke E. Swager
Thomas Akers
Jerri D. Bair
Gary A. Berriman
Benjamin Crandell
Robert R. Damaske
Adam Dickerson
Gary Hellenga
Jeffrey S. Nelson
Steven Nichols
Joe Phelan
Howard Schroeder
Rachel L. McAngus
Brad P. Davis
Daniel Haney, Jr.
Cary W. Loubert
Brian Andrews
Brian D. Haney
Robert E. Kemp
Kevin Bornhorst
Scott C. Sandy
Jason Behrens
Edward Boggs
Marek Bryda
David Fox
Scott T. Mehlhose
Mitchell T. Robson
Andrew Bajc
Andrew Berg
Craig Caskey
Gene Creamer
Darwin Godemann
Shawn Gouldin
Scott Griess
Owen Grimm
Scott Howell
Dustin Johnson
Randall Jurgens
Chad Ladwig
Frank Logsdon
Michael Mertens
Cody Morris
Nhat Nguyen
Charles Nichols
Kenneth Nitzel
Darrel Otkin
Troy Pedersen
Allen Ptacek
Michael Shea
Aaron Spulak
Jerome Sveeggen
Timothy Wingert
Michael Zimbelman

COMPANY AWARDS

Bronze
Duncan Aviation, Inc.

Diamond
Elliott Aviation of Omaha, Inc.
ConAgra Foods
Union Pacific Railroad

Trying to cut risk or the mishap rate with technology alone is like trying to cut a paper with half a pair of scissors.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Flight Standards District Office
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Suite 120
Lincoln, NE 68524

AIRCRAFT SPECIALTIES INC
3336 SOUTH 66TH AVENUE
OMAHA NE 68106

WE'RE ON THE WEB

http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/field_offices/fsdo/lnk/

AVIATION MAINTENANCE ALERTS

Beechcraft A-36 – Imploded Tip-Tank; ATA 2810
"(This aircraft's…) R/H Osborne Inc. auxiliary fuel tip tank imploded," states the technician (P/N 55000-105). "(It has been…) determined the probable cause was a plugged vent. Guidance suggest: (1) when parked, keep the vent capped with a pitot-like cover, (2) during preflight…open the gas cap, connect a tube to the ¼ inch vent tube and blow, (verifying) the vent is not plugged." Obviously, a restricted vent should be cleared before flight. (The SDRS database reflects one specific entry of insects clogging this vent.) Part Total Time: unknown.

Cessna 172RG – Cracked Landing Gear Actuators; ATA3233
(The following is a composite of three separate defect reports from the same technician on the same model-but different aircraft.) The first submission states, "The pilot (for this aircraft) reported a side load on landing. On a subsequent takeoff, the R/H main landing gear would not fully retract. (Inspection…) found the R/H actuator (P/N 9882015-2) cracked at the forward bolt hole." Another aircraft produced a similar defect during a 100-hour inspection for the L/H retraction actuator (same part number): It was not only cracked but the upper forward bolt was found sheared. The third defect report again describes failure of another 172 aircraft's L/H main gear to retract…and the same"…actuator cracked at the forward bolt hole…" as the above discrepancy. (The reported part time on each aircraft's failed actuator were 2,893.6, unknown, and 1,407.2 hours, respectively. The SDRS database records 28 entries related to this ATA code since 1995.) Part Total (averaged) Time: 2,150.4 hours.

ACK Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) E-01 - Leaking Duracell MN1300 Batteries; ATA 2562
A mechanic describes inspection an ACK ELT (emergency locator transmitter) as required by 14 CFR Part 91, Section 91.207(d) during an annual aircraft inspection. "The 24 month old Duracell MN1300 batteries were found leaking, with fluid visible in the bottom of the unit. These batteries were all dated March 2009. (I) recommend replacing batteries in these type of unites each 12 months or requiring a sealed battery installation." Part Total Time: 24 months. Courtesy FAA Aviation News.

CAUTION:
DENSITY ALTITUDE
THUNDERSTORMS